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99%  
campaign

MAGAZINE

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Youth

VOICES ON

Youth

RADICALISATION

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14 Dock Offices, London, SE16 2XU, United Kingdom

[contact@iars.org.uk](mailto:contact@iars.org.uk) | [www.iars.org.uk](http://www.iars.org.uk)

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
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# YOUR VOICE



# YOUR MAGAZINE



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The IARS International Institute was informally set up in 2001 by Theo Gavrielides to act as an international network on youth matters. Since then we have expanded our remit to cover three areas of work: Youth | Equalities | Justice.

IARS is now recognised as one of the world's leading user-led Institutes with a mission "To give everyone a chance to forge a safer, fairer and more inclusive society."

The Institute was formally registered in 2005 and in 2015 we celebrated our 10 official years of giving. Since our inception we have been providing voice and educational programmes as well as non-profit research, policy and networking services of local, national and international significance. We are focused on empowering the most marginalised communities through direct service delivery, while enabling organisations to achieve, measure and improve their social impact.

We also have a mission to transform young people's lives by enabling them to have a better future, and participate equally and democratically in civic life. IARS' young people learn to inform policies and practices affecting them whether at a local, regional, national or international level. We are dedicated to helping deliver the EU Youth Strategy by "Investing and Empowering" our young people.

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- Encouraging, supporting and facilitating them to acquire a voice in democratic life, and use the useful results of that research and learning to increase awareness and understanding of the issues which affect them including amongst others decision makers, governments, policy makers, service providers and the public".

We deliver our charitable mission:

- By empowering marginalised individuals of our society through accredited training, educational programmes, men-

toring and one-to-one support;

- By acting as an international network of NGOs bringing together people and ideas to share best practice and engage in debates on current social problems
- By carrying out action research and evaluation that is independent, credible, peer-reviewed, user-led, focused and current
- By supporting individuals and grass roots organisations to carry out their own initiatives to shape decision-making and society, and by helping them to maximise their social impact
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## 99% Campaign Pledge

The “99% Campaign Pledge” initiative aims to bring together, young people, members of the public, organisations and groups to celebrate the 99% of young people who are making a real and positive contribution to our diverse communities.

Those committing to support the 99% campaign and its key principles will be entitled to use the 99% ‘pledge mark’ in recognition of their support.

By signing up to the Pledge you can display the 99% pledge mark.



More on:

<http://www.99percentcampaign.org/the-99-percent-campaign/the-99-campaign-pledge/>



# 99% Magazine



The 99% Campaign Magazine is a unique youth led magazine collecting the best articles written about young people on topics impacting on them. Designed, written and published by young people as part of the youth led 99% Campaign.



The 99% Campaign Magazine (2nd Edition) is a unique youth led magazine collecting the best articles written about young people on topics impacting on them. Designed, written and published by young people as part of the youth led 99% Campaign, funded by the Nominet Trust.



Through a compilation of articles, news, poetry and youth photojournalism projects, the 99% Campaign Magazine, provides a platform for young people to express their stories, views and experiences about issues affecting their daily lives, with the intention of stimulating social action, and influencing key public figures in the media and governments. This entirely youth-led and youth focused work represents their real voices and their aspirations to create a fairer future for themselves and their peers from diverse backgrounds.



The fourth issue of the 99% campaign magazine, the lasting impact of Brexit on young people is explored. This publication allows young people to express their concerns related to employment, social care, the economy and education.

# FOREWORD

## THE YOUTH EMPOWERMENT AND INNOVATION PROJECT (YEIP)

**PROF. THEO GAVRIELIDES**

*IARS Founder and  
YEIP Scientific Coordinator*



Welcome to the 5th Edition of the 99% Campaign Magazine.

This year, the Magazine is dedicated to the issue of violent youth radicalisation. Over the last few years, the terms violent radicalisation, hate crimes, xenophobia, extremism and terrorism have become central features in our political, policy and public debates, social media, academic writings and research, TV, radio, paper and online news. Indeed, much has been written and said about these terms; the beliefs and perceptions that feed them, as well as the criticism, sensitivity and controversies that surround them. It is not my intention to repeat them here.

In fact, the purpose of this magazine is to help move the debate forward by helping all those interested in the topic of violent youth radicalisation to see it from a new prism. It is with this hope that I applied to the European Commission (EC) to fund the Youth Empowerment and Innovation Project (YEIP) that has informed this publication.

YEIP was a 3-year Erasmus+ funded programme that designed a youth-led, positive policy prevention framework for tackling and preventing the marginalisation and violent radicalisation among young people in Europe. The project run between March 2017 – February 2020. It was developed in response to Erasmus+ Key Action 3 – Policy Experimentation. The Erasmus Call was directed to high level public authorities, focusing on policy. IARS agreed with the Home Office to delegate its power to the Institute, which applied on its behalf and was successful in proposing a youth-led project that would bring together one of the largest consortia of public and civil society organisations to achieve the Call's objectives.

Led by young people and YEIP was delivered in partnership with 18 partners **from seven EU countries** to construct and test an innovative, policy intervention model founded on the principles of restorative justice, positive psychology and the Good Lives Model (GLM).

YEIP was implemented through the construction and field validation of tools (YEIP PREVENT model/ interventions, toolkit, training) in **4 environments** (schools, universities, prisons, online) in **the UK, Greece, Cyprus, Portugal, Sweden, Italy and Romania**.

The project was broken down into four scientific blocks. The first block involved secondary research as well as primary fieldwork with 133 participants. The second block carried out fieldwork with 380 participants. The third scientific block involved a total of 478 young people, 354 professionals and 195 policy

makers. Finally, the fourth block involved 1408 young participants and 517 professionals.

In total, YEIP directly engaged with and spoke to **3540 individuals** from as young as 16 years old to 78. Arguably, this is one of the largest scientific studies on violent youth radicalisation in Europe.

It is my hope that YEIP and this magazine will lay the foundations for systemic change in the way we deal with violent youth radicalisation at the national and EU levels. The ultimate objective was for the project to help implement the EU Youth Strategy's objective of preventing the factors that can lead to young people's social exclusion and radicalisation. The project was also in line with the EU's Counter-Terrorism Strategy of 2005 (revised in 2008 and 2014). I hope that this book and the results of the project help deliver these strategies.

Finally, I want to believe that the success of this youth-led project will demonstrate to European citizens the leadership and determination of EC institutions in rooting out the reasons that lead to young peoples' marginalisation and violent radicalisation, firming up in this way trust and confidence. At a time, when European solidarity is questioned, our young people can lead us in re-establishing the very values and reasons that united Europe in the first place.

## YEIP's youth-led research methodology

One of the most innovative features of YEIP was its ground-breaking and unique youth-led research and project methodology. This drew from the field of participatory action research, which is experimental research that focuses on the effects of the researcher's direct actions of practice within a participatory community with the goal of improving the performance quality of the community or an area of concern (Dick 2002). Within this realm, youth-led research is identified. Admittedly, the extant literature on youth-led research is scant and thus the risks considerable (Gavrielides, 2014; Gough, 2006). However, IARS has been a pioneer in this area having introduced some of the first youth led fieldwork in Europe and tested them for policy reform (see Youth in Action)<sup>1</sup>.

In a paper published in the *Youth Voice Journal*, a young researcher, Cass, describes the underlying principles of youth-led research and policy as "(1) addressing power imbalances; (2) valuing lived experiences; (3) respecting choice in participation; and (4) empowerment". The youth-led approach dictates that young people must be left to instigate potential solutions to a problem, one

that they have indeed identified themselves, and take responsibility for developing and implementing a solution. Consequently, the youth-led method repositions young people as important stakeholders who can make unique decisions which impact on the quality of their lives, rather than simply accepting the position as passive subjects whose lives are guided by decisions made by adult 'others'.

To this end, we took the following steps, when conducting youth-led research for YEIP:

Step 1: Relinquish power and "remove hats"

Step 2: Reach out widely and recruit diverse groups in partnership with others

Step 3: Empower through ad hoc and tailored accredited training that is flexible and adjustable to young people's needs as these are defined by their diverse lives

Step 4: Facilitate discussions on current topics that need change

Step 5: Coordinate their action research and support to write evidence based solutions through peer reviewed processes

Step 6: Support the evaluation, monitoring, project management and control of all previous steps through youth-led tools and a standing Youth Advisory Board

Step 7: Reward and accredit.

The NGO partners in each participating country, recruited and trained a total of **75 young people** in order to empower them to carry out the research themselves. As a youth-led project, YEIP did not want to replicate the methods that have been used to understand violent youth radicalisation. Below you can see a breakdown of the demographics of the young people who led on the research and who continue to support the project through other activities.

The impact and scalability of the YEIP GLM-based policy measure was assessed through a semi-experimental methodology that sought to identify and evaluate the causality link between our measure and the change it aims to make for young people at risk of radicalisation and marginalisation. A combination of qualitative and quantitative research tools were used.

The scientific work of YEIP comprised of five different building blocks that were represented via different work packages (WPs) WPs. Following a thorough literature review (WP1) and the collection of stakeholders' views

<sup>1</sup> See [www.youthvoicejournal.com](http://www.youthvoicejournal.com)




through youth-led research (WP2), we constructed the tools that implemented our policy measure (i.e. the YEIP Prevent model/ intervention and a toolkit). These tools were used to capacity build professionals working in our selected environments. Subsequently, field trials (WP3) were conducted in the participating countries. These piloted and evaluated the tools implementing our policy measure and were observed through a mixture of qualitative methodologies. Impact measurement was achieved through a before-after comparison. To triangulate the findings, a pan-European quantitative survey was also carried out (WP4). The research design and approach were youth-led, following the principles of participatory, youth-led action research. Below is what we originally envisaged:

**First building block (WP1):** It aims to “build the foundations” by analysing the current state of the art. To this end, existing knowledge in the selected case study countries will be assessed both in terms of policy, research and practice. A comparative analysis between the case studies and a cross European review will also be conducted alongside a stakeholder mapping. Following this, our experimentation protocol will be finalised

**Second building block (WP2):** This will have two aims. First, to test the underlying hypothesis of the GLM-based YEIP policy measure. Second, to construct the tools that will implement YEIP’s policy measure (i.e. the YEIP PREVENT model/ intervention and toolkit). Both goals will be achieved by carrying out youth-led primary research in four environments: schools, universities, Youth Offending Institutions and online.

**Third building block (WP3):** This will have two aims. First, to test the YEIP GLM-based policy intervention by conducting field trials following capacity building of professionals using the tools constructed under building blocks 1 and 2. They will be conducted in the country case studies within the four selected environments. Second, to identify and evaluate a causality link between YEIP’s policy measure and tools, and the change that has occurred in our target groups within selected environments. The findings will determine the logic behind the change (counterfactual analysis). A quasi-experimental method will be used by relying on assumptions that will help us justify the claim that the comparison group is similar to the treatment group. To this end, we will carry out before-after comparisons using the same population which undertook the YEIP intervention within a 6-month period.

**Fourth Building block (WP4):** This will aim to triangulate our findings through a quantitative methodology that will counteract the weaknesses found in qualitative methods. Two online surveys will be designed and disseminated across Europe throughout the lifetime of WP2 and 3.



*Figure 1: The YEIP Building Blocks*

## Background & Impetus

YEIP was created in response to a current social need to have more effective youth policies that can enhance young people’s social inclusion and minimize the risk of radicalization with greater ‘buy in’ from youth themselves.

To this end, YEIP constructed and tested an innovative policy intervention, which generated a set of actions that

will help address this need at the local, national and European levels. This measure is founded upon restorative justice and the Good Lives Model (GLM), which assumes that we are goal-influenced and all seek certain 'goods' in our lives, not 'material', but qualitative, all likely to increase or improve our psychological well-being (Ward, Mann and Gannon 2007).

Through the use of multi-disciplinary tools, we constructed tools that tested and implemented this measure at the local, national and EU wide level. The ultimate objective is for the project to help address the Erasmus KA3 objectives (especially PT7) as these are aligned with the EU Youth Strategy's objective of preventing the factors that can lead to young people's social exclusion and radicalisation.

Existing approaches are constructed within the Risk Need Responsivity (RNR) model for prevention. Developed in the 1980s by Andrews, Bonta and Hope (1990), RNR's focus is on reducing and managing risk as well as on studying the process of relapse. Pathology-focused research and intervention have consequently been developed as tools for RNR based approaches to rehabilitation.

According to Maruna (2006) and Gavrielides and Piers (2013; 2015), RNR is now challenged at practical, policy and financial levels. They argued that concentrating on criminogenic needs to reduce risk factors are not a sufficient condition when it comes to young people. McAdams (1994; 2006) argues that integration and relatedness for young people are crucial in encouraging desistance from violence and radicalisation. Politicians and the public also seem to agree with the extant literature. For instance, the UK Justice Secretary said that prison often turns out to be "a costly and ineffectual approach that fails to turn criminals into law-abiding citizens" (Travis 2010). YEIP aimed to turn the RNR approach on its head. Instead of "managing" young people as "risks", our policy measure focused on pro-

moting the talents and strengths of vulnerable young people and through this approach help develop positive identities. The extant literature has defined these as being "the internal organisation of a coherent sense of self" (Dean 2014). The GLM operates in both a holistic and constructive manner in considering how young people at risk might identify and work towards a way of living that is likely to involve the goods we seek in life, as well as a positive way of living that does not involve or need crime (Scottish Prison Service 2011).

In this process, the argument is that the model works towards a positive, growth-oriented change in life where an offender works on the development of the values, skills and resources towards life based on human goods that is a necessary counter-balance of managing risk alone (Ward, Mann and Gannon 2007: 92), i.e. risk is managed as well as seeking to develop positive life alternatives. This approach is aligned with the underlying philosophy of 2014 EC report on youth workers, which asks for a more coordinated effort in supporting young people with fewer opportunities by tapping into their talents and not by further marginalising them.

This magazine draws some important conclusions that make me ask: what will it take for society to finally raise the mirror of responsibility and look well into its reflection? Every time I look into this mirror, I see nothing but myself and a thousand other fellow citizens. We are the real architects of the social fabric that generates the extremist ideologies, which then gradually corrupt universal values such as tolerance and the respect of life, dignity and brotherhood. The extremist ideology that leads those young men, men and women, to act inhumane is not an alien virus of unknown origin. It is a product of our way of living.

# EDITORIAL

## DAVID RUAH

*Member of the Radicalisation  
Awareness Network*



Extremist violence is on the rise in Europe, and this is no longer a mere local problem confined to the different nation-states, although it is neither an exclusive sign of the 21st century. The ideological extremist nature that leads to terrorist violence is rooted in our ancient psychology, such as our animal desire for social and political power. In this sense, we will always have problems connected to radicalisation from time to time, and we will always have to minimize them, but radicalisation as a social phenomenon is dependent on contextual variables that shape it, causing extremist movements to adopt new strategies.

What, then, are the contemporary strategies and trends of the new extremist movements?

If, on the one hand, we have Islamist-related radicalisation and far right-related radicalisation, both share mutual characteristics that attract a growing number of followers for each one in a reciprocal power cycle. First, both consist of a nonlinear social process that is associated with psychological or social vulnerability as a trigger of the process. Such vulnerabilities may be characterized as a sense of existential demand coupled with a political scepticism that considers elites corrupt and ineffective, but there may also be other factors such as financial needs and unemployment, or even discrimination, and xenophobia. These vulnerabilities underline the radicalisation process and, if not properly addressed, can progress, especially in cases where the vulnerable individual contacts other already radicalized vulnerable individuals. The next phase then consists of creating social networks that exploit feelings of social injustice in a solid extremist ideology, such a stage does not necessarily predict violence but may materialize minor offences in the context of organized militancy. The online world plays an important role in accelerating the process of networking because it allows extremist groups to become online militias that disseminate illegal hate speech. After the militancy phase, the vulnerable individual then becomes an extremist, but in a robust cognitive view, through which the individual comes to claim a set of immutable beliefs that undermine freedom of belief, such as hatred of a minority, not tolerating other perspectives and denying the possibility of debate.

Finally, the last stage of this radicalisation process when, eventually, the individual becomes a terrorist in which he or she commits acts of violence against civilians in order to achieve political goals. This last stage is not necessary in order for someone be considered a radical, but it is for a radical to be considered a terrorist.

On the other hand, when we are referring to radicalisation, we are referring to new contemporary strategies, such as (1) the operational decentralization of terrorist cells, (2) the existence of self-processes of radicalisation, (3) the problem of hate language ambiguity and (4) the online world as a catalyst for radicalisation. All the mentioned features are shared by both extremist violence movements associated with Islamist views and the far right, as well as others. The characteristics of operational decentralization and

the existence of radicalisation self-processes lead us to characterize the contemporary threat of radicalisation as transnational in concept, but also in its own operationalization. Therefore, if Europe wants to combat and prevent radicalisation effectively, it must take into account its transnational threat, which in turn implies the existence of radical processes in several European countries but also their contextualization to national realities: certainly, problems with Islamic radicalisation in France will not be answered in the same way as problems with violent neo-Nazi groups in Germany.

The Youth Empowerment and Innovation Project (YEIP) aims to respond to this fragmentary identity of radicalisation in Europe through the plural formation of its own consortium comprising 18 partners located in 7 European countries, namely the United Kingdom as consortium's leader, Greece, Cyprus, Italy, Portugal, Sweden, and Romania. A study of radicalisation in so many countries has a sufficiently representative sample of what European radicalisation is as a concept which is a social representation of the sum of its constituent parts. This study intends to build and test a model of political intervention based on the principles of restorative justice, positive psychology and the Good Lives Model, structured on the basis of 5 scientific work-packages and based on the youth-led methodology that leads the project in all its parts. One of the cross-sectional conclusions inferred by the reader when reading the project's books is that Europe does not have an international legal definition of radicalisation, but various working national definitions of radicalisation empirically inferred throughout the project. Another conclusion that we can infer is that in some countries, participants referred to specific forms of radicalisation connected to criminal phenomena, what can be relatable to the so-called nexus between terrorism and crime. For instance, according to the project's participants, in countries such as Italy, radicalisation is related to Mafia. On the other hand, in Portugal, there are no signals of radicalization but there are other relatable criminal problems such as cyberbullying and online hate speech. In the same country, there are a lot of initiatives to counter marginalization leading to organized crime, even though there are no initiatives directly related to radicalisation leading to terrorism.

Furthermore, the YEIP project cycle insightfully infers that radicalisation is related to social and psychological manipulation and that the hearts of young people are the most vulnerable in this regard. Because young people are the main target and victims of radicalisation, they are characterized by still believing and claiming ideals and fighting for them. However, if nobody

involves them in the civic and political participation of society, how can they distinguish the right ideals from mere demagogic and extremist manipulation? We need to actively involve young people in research, policy and practice related to the prevention of radicalisation leading to terrorism (PVE).

The Security Council Resolution 2250 on Youth, Peace, and Security recognizes the importance of engaging young women and men in modelling and sustaining security and peace initiatives. UNSCR 2250 calls on the Member-States to include young people in their institutions and mechanisms to prevent violent conflict, including the prevention of radicalisation processes. YEIP follows Resolution 2250 stated by the United Nations when creating a transnational project that is not only peer-participatory but youth-led, particularly when involving youth in developing policy-oriented research. And this is a characteristic that makes the project unique, as many projects affirm youth participation, but few materialize it in more than merely symbolic functions.

Nevertheless, we should still address the question: why should projects, such as the YEIP, decide to involve young people in the world of the prevention of violent extremism? In the first place, because young people have peer-to-peer access to networks that include vulnerable young people, but also because most of the time already have developed counter and alternative narratives, as well as resilience to violent extremism and other forms of violent conflict. Counter and alternative narratives are highly important to challenge online hate speech and online propaganda, and youngsters are innovative, creative and used to work with social media. Finally, they understand the way young people look at the world and what will grab their attention. For all these reasons, yes, we should actively involve young people in the world of PVE, and YEIP truly is an innovative project in doing that.







**6<sup>th</sup> edition****FOREWORD**

THEO GAVRIELIDES

p. 7

**EDITORIAL**

DAVID RUAH

p. 11

**Why is YEIP Important**

ALEX GOLDHILL

p. 16

**Violent Extremist Radicalisation**

EKERETTE E. SAMPSON

p. 17

**Social Media, Parenting and Radicalization**

YEWANDE OGUNJIMI

p. 22

**The Role of YouTube Algorithms in Online Radicalization**

AMANDA BLACKHURST

p. 24

**Twitter and Radicalisation**

ADITYA DAS

p. 26

**Safaa Boular and her radical experience**

ALI AHMED, WILLIAM BURGE

p. 29

**Youth Radicalisation and Education**

KRISTIAN MOWER

p. 31

**Behind the Fiery Cross**

AMA YAROBI

p. 32

**Radicalised de-radicalisation**

ALESSANDRO ZAVOLI

p. 33

**The Sad Life of the Exeter Bomber**

ARTHUR PEIRCE

p. 36

**Radicalisation, Terrorism & Social Enterprise**

JAMES MYERS

p. 38

**Is Youth Radicalisation a Safeguarding and Child Protection Issue?**

MAIJA LINNALA AND AMANDA BLACKHURST

p. 40



# WHY IS YEIP IMPORTANT



*Alex Goldhill*

Our current approach to tackling violent youth radicalisation in the UK is broken. From the moment that the Prevent program was put into place back in 2003 it has faced criticism from both leading academics who have questioned its effectiveness and some communities that have felt victimised by its approach. Such issues have carried on in recent years. Earlier this very month, the government has faced renewed calls from academics to scrap the Prevent program and has faced widespread criticisms for the inclusion of non-violent groups such as the environmentalist movement Extinction Rebellion and the Campaign Against Arms Trade, as well as protests groups such as Greenpeace, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and the Palestine Solidarity Campaign, on the same list as far-right neo-Nazi hate groups. At the same time, recent studies have also found that the government's own definitions of extremism designed to tackle violent groups, which defines extremism as:

“Vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs ... calls for the death of members of our armed forces (are also) extremist”

fails to adequately address far-right extremism, with many far-right organisations, such as the EDL, Britain First and the Democratic Football Lads Alliance actively claiming to embrace “British values” and defend various liberal and civil rights as a means of attacking British Muslims and other minorities. One notable example was the neo-Nazi organisation National Action, which the government had to resort to counter-terrorism legislation to proscribe despite their openly violent and racist ideology. YEIP's research into the current state of the art for dealing with violent radicalisation in the UK has shown similar problems with a lack of a clear definition of radicalisation and the need to distinguish between radical behaviour, radicalisation and extremism.

This is not a problem exclusive to the UK and similar issues are present across Europe. In Sweden, for example, with regards to violence committed in the name of Islam both empirically-based field studies and policy-oriented research were lacking in scientific rigour and often lacked a solid empirical basis, whilst research into radicalisation often rested on insufficient empirical data. In Portugal there was an “absence of a policy for the prevention of radicalization of youth, in general, and in schools or online, in particular” and that “jihadist extremism is more a preoccupation than a real threat”. In Romania we found that there is “a dearth of work exploring marginalisation and radicalisation of young people”. These examples only scratch the surface of the problem.

What all of these examples have in common is a worldview based on a “Risk Need Responsivity” (RNR) model where the focus is on reducing and managing risk as well as on studying the processes of relapse. This approach means that policies, laws and practices have focused on setting up and managing a criminal justice system that aims to deal with offenders' negative traits (Andrews, Bonta and Hoge 1990). Despite widespread criticism from academics and practitioners RNR is generally accepted as the benchmark against which rehabilitation programmes should be measured and tested (Mapham and Hefferon, 2012). Central to this model is an attitude grounded in “disadvantage thinking” (Gavrielides, 2017; 2014) which



is based on the premise that if people are accessing a public service then they must have a problem. This is especially true for young people. Such an approach is demoralising to those that need this support and feeds into stereotypes and prejudice. It creates a frail democracy that is incompatible with our sense of security, safety, equality and dignity (Gavrielides, 2017).

So where does YEIP come in? Over the past three years the Youth Empowerment and Innovation Project has been conducting youth-led research in seven EU countries with the support of 18 partners with the aim of designing a youth-led, positive policy prevention framework for tackling and preventing the marginalisation and violent radicalisation among young people in Europe. Seeking to move away from the flawed RNR model and towards a positive approach based on the Good Lives Model which assumes that we are goal-influenced and all seek certain 'goods' in our lives, not 'material', but qualitative, all likely to increase or improve our psychological well-being (Ward, Mann and Gannon 2007).

Such an approach, grounded in principles of restorative justice and positive psychology and aiming to put young people at the heart of the matter, would work

towards a positive, growth-oriented change in life where an offender works on the development of the values, skills and resources towards life based on human goods that is a necessary counter-balance of managing risk alone (ibid p92).

Based on our research, we developed and tested policy toolkits designed with the input of professionals and young people at all levels to tackle these issues. The demand for a positive approach is strong, over the course of our studies we have found that both young people and professionals consistently display a strong willingness to work with each other in developing positive policies and programs to tackling the issues of violent youth radicalisation and that they were eager to apply the Good Lives Model and the principles of Restorative Justice.

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## VIOLENT EXTREMIST RADICALISATION

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*Ekerette E. Sampson*

### Introduction

In the past two decades, the world has witnessed a dramatic increase in the number of terrorist attacks. The July 2005 attacks in London, signaled that perpetrators of these violent acts (British citizens), though not hardened by conflicts, tend to be disenfranchised members of British society (Christmann, 2012). In Africa, the Middle East and western Asia, conflicts have fueled waves of refugees and migrants. As such, radicalisation and the use of violence has become

a growing issue and efforts need to be made to understand this emerging phenomenon in order to formulate strategies that can stem the tide.

### Definition of radicalisation

The term 'radical' was first used in the 18th century often linked to progressive values of the enlightenment and the French and American revolutions of that period. Over time, it has come to signify the support for an extreme section of a party (Van Rompuy et al, 2017). Academic pa-

pers and literature recognises radicalisation as a process whereby people turn to some form of extremism in order to promote an ideology, a political project or a cause as a means of social transformation (Lopez and Pasic, 2018; OSCE, 2017). Additionally, as a process, radicalisation leading to violence implies the adoption of an ideology, which becomes a way of life and framework for meaningful action, the belief in the use of violence as a means to promote a cause, and the merging of ideology and violent action. It is also important to note that the term 'extremism' generates its own difficulties (especially since it is broad with many meanings), therefore adding the adjective 'violent' resolves the ambiguity associated with the term but leaves unanswered questions about the relationship between violent and non-violent forms of extremism (OSCE, 2017).

From this, what can be understood is that radicalisation is a gradual process that requires a progression through distinct stages. Furthermore, it should be recognised as a context-specific term that is subject to local driving factors, which makes it challenging to define (UNDP, 2015). What is seen as radical in one culture may be considered moderate or extreme in another culture (Van Rompuy et al, 2017).

## Forms and process


Radicalisation leading to violence can take many diverse forms depending on the context, time and the different causes or ideologies associated with it. Lopez and Pasic (2018) distinguish between four types of violent radicalisation. First, is right-wing extremist violence generally associated with racism, fascism and ultra-nationalism, and characterised by violent defence of racial, ethnic or pseudo-national identity. Second, is left-wing extremist violence, which is associated with anti-capitalist demands and calls for the transformation of political systems that produce social inequalities and may employ violent means to further its cause. Third, is politico-religious extremists violence mostly associated with the political interpretation of religion and the defence of religious identity by violent means. Finally, there is single-issue extremists' violence, which is motivated by a sole and specific issue, such as radical environmental/animal rights groups and other anti-globalization movements.

Literature places emphasis on radicalisation being a process composed of distinct and identifiable phases, charting an individual's transition from early involvement to being operationally active (Christmann, 2012). Therefore, some models showing the processes of radicalisation and how people get to be involved in extremist's violence will be briefly explored.

## The Prevent Pyramid

This model (developed by the Association of Chief Police in response to the UK governments prevent strategy), conceives radicalisation as a progressive movement up a pyramid-type model, where higher levels are associated with increased levels of radicalisation but with a decreased number of those involved (Christmann, 2012). At Tier 4 of the model, you have an active terrorist breaking the law and carrying out terrorist activities. Tier 3 is the stage where sympathizers of terrorist movements provide tacit support to the active terrorist breaking the law (tier 4) and inspire those in tier 2, without committing any violent acts themselves. Tier 2 is where the vulnerable (such as young people in the criminal justice system) who are easily influenced by the messages of those in tier 3. At the bottom of the pyramid (Tier 1) is the wider community, although it is unclear how broad this group is.

Figure. 1.



Source: Christmann (2012)

Indeed, from the perspective of this model radicalisation is the gradient distinguishing the active terrorist from the broader base of sympathisers. However, there are questions that need to be answered on how people move from the bottom of the pyramid to the top. Reason being that the radicalisation process is unpredictable and more complicated than the process assumed by this model (Bartlett et al, 2010).

## The Staircase to Terrorism

This model provides a multi-casual approach to understanding suicide terrorism. The staircase to terrorism involves three levels; the individual (dispositional factors), the organizational (structural factors) and environmental (socio-cultural, economic and political factors) (Christmann, 2012). The idea is that a staircase, housed in a building where everyone is on the ground floor, but very few people ascend to higher floors, with few reaching the top of the building. The movement up each



Figure.2.



Level 5: Terrorist acts carried out

#### Level 4: Immersion: us vs. them

Level 3: Moral engagement  
(terrorism justified)

Level 2: Displaced aggression/bla-me

Level 1: Increasing perceptions of injustice

Ground floor: Relative deprivation  
and other factors

## Ecological Model

Figure.3.



Source: Lopez and Pasic (2009)

Individual factors help to identify some tendencies in the profiles of radicalized individuals, i.e. factors which may make a young person more vulnerable to certain influences.

The relational level factors are linked to close relationships (family, friends).

The mesosystemic level corresponds to institutional and community factors.

The macrosystemic level corresponds to influences of large social systems (justice, education), state actions and geopolitical variables.


The exosystemic level covers culture and values surrounding other levels of understanding.

At all levels, there are various recruitment opportunities, spaces, contexts and situations that may facilitate the process of radicalisation leading to violence. The driving factors and opportunities overlap and influence one another, meaning they cannot be analysed in isolation, but are mutually reinforcing and interdependent (Lopez and Pasic, 2009).

## Drivers of radicalisation

serve as instrumental incentives. The drivers of violent extreme radicalisation are thought to be multiple and interrelated; economic, historical, ideological, affecting individuals, groups, and communities at local, regional and national levels (UNDP, 2016). However, the factors associated with terrorism are distinctly different in countries in the global north compared to those in the global south. As figure 4 shows in OECD countries, opportunities for youth, the free flow of information, criminality and access to weapons are associated with greater impacts for terrorism. While in non-OECD countries, the continuation of ongoing conflicts, corruption and political instability correlates to with higher levels of terrorism.

Figure.4.



Source: Institute for Economics and Peace (2016)

Essentially, what needs to be understood is that there are several inter-linking motivations, which in diverse combinations facilitate radicalisation processes depending on the context. These point to many factors (structural, systemic, political and socio-economic), individual factors (personal and idiosyncratic), factors based on perceived experiences (inequality, exclusion, marginalization and discrimination) (UNDP, 2015).

## The impact

Violent extremists radicalisation does have some impacts especially on countries most affected by the

phenomenon. This offers some critical challenges to national, regional and global levels, making inadequate the traditional tools of violence prevention and democratic governance (UNDP, 2016). Over 32,000 people lost their lives globally in 2014 with 29,000 in 2015, as a result of violent extremists radicalisation (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2016). This loss of lives has also been felt especially with the mobilization of extreme right-wing groups and individuals, leading to deaths in Europe, as well as the killing and displacement of people in Africa and the Middle East.

These displacements have been a source of great tension in Europe as it has led to people migrating from those conflict affected regions to the relative safety of European countries. Furthermore, of the 970,000 refugees and migrants crossing the Mediterranean to Europe in 2015, 49% came from Syria, 21% from Afghanistan and 8% from Iraq (UNDP, 2016).

Economically, the total economic impact of extremist violence globally in 2015 was \$89.6 billion, which is a 15% drop from the peak 2014 level of \$105.6 billion (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2016). In addition, Iraq suffered the highest economic impact from terrorism in 2015, as 17% of its GDP was affected by terrorist activities. As figure 5 shows, the countries most affected by terrorism were conflicted/ fragile nations in the Middle East, North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia.

Figure.5.

The economic impact of terrorism as percentage of GDP is highest in countries where conflict is ongoing.

RANK	COUNTRY	% OF GDP
1	Iraq	17.3%
2	Afghanistan	16.8%
3	Syria	8.3%
4	Yemen	7.3%
5	Libya	5.7%
6	South Sudan	4.8%
7	Nigeria	4.5%
8	Pakistan	2.8%
9	Niger	2.1%
10	Central African Republic	2.1%

Source: Institute for Economics and Peace (2016)

### Counter-radicalisation strategies

It can be understood from earlier sections, violent extremist radicalisation is a security issue that does not require governments to take on hardline approaches so

as not to risk inflaming violent extremism. It requires a multi-dimensional approach, such as collaboration between civil society and the state on programs that could act as a bulwark against violent extremists radicalisation (UNDP, 2016). Additionally, such an approach should be inclusive and anchored in tolerance, political and economic empowerment, and the reduction in social inequalities.

In Europe, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) facilitates processes and practices on countering violent extremism, especially considering the varying levels of capacity amongst its members. It has set national action plans that focus on addressing local drivers and national counter-terrorism strategies (Neumann, 2017). In the UK, deradicalization initiatives are supplemented with consideration for programs tackling right-wing radicalisation and some deradicalization programs operating in several Islamic countries (Christmann, 2012). The idea is that these two contexts together, will provide some learning points for the future development of de-radicalisation programs in the UK. The Prevent Initiative on countering violent extremism in the UK, is aimed at promoting tolerance and democratic principles, improving communication and building trust between authorities and communities, as well as rehabilitate people radicalized to violence (Van Rompuy et al, 2017).

In the Middle East, North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, measures aimed at tackling socio-economic issues/drivers (such as education, governance, employment and empowering marginalized populations), addressing weak rule of law and over-reactive security strategies, building community resilience and involving technology and media, should be recognised as important measures and strategies in countering violent extremist radicalisation (UNDP, 2015). This is because sustainable solutions for the prevention of violent extremism requires an inclusive development approach based on tolerance, political and economic empowerment, and reduction in inequalities.

### Conclusion

As stated, countering violent extremism requires a multi-dimensional approach, as there is a need for a comprehensive, multi-stakeholder long-term strategy to stem the rise of the phenomenon. It should be understood as a gradual process through different stages in order for the menace to be tackled. Although, there are no commonly agreed definitions for radicalisation and violent extremism, the phenomenon exploits a wide range of socio-economic, political and cultural grievances which may be countered by promoting values and ideas relative to the context, as well as promoting liberal

democratic principles and the empowerment of critical societal actors. Democratic principles such as the rule of law, freedom of speech and human rights need to be enforced so that citizens can be empowered to challenge violent extremists' discourses and narratives. In addition, civil society organisations can be important actors in this regard, as they are capable of providing support to the vulnerable especially as they promote bottoms up approaches which include groups and organisations which would have generally been excluded from participating in programs set up by government officials to counter violent extremism.

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## SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORM LEVERAGE ON RADICALISATION

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*Yewande Ogunjimi*

My name is Yewande, I am a recent psychology graduate from Middlesex University and these are my views on social media and radicalisation.

Social media has become a space that encourages the user's freedom of expression. The traditional media fades as younger generations become comfortable with the idea of using networking platforms such as Twitter, Facebook and Instagram as a means for obtaining facts and exploring self-identity. Most youth have become induced to social media filter bubbles whereby they are easily targeted and exposed to extreme ideas.

With the ever-increasing power of social networks comes the increased capacity to encourage extremism. Extremist know how to influence vulnerable young people as they are aware that many seek



support, belonging and identity. They are also aware that young people have been perceived to be ‘troublemakers’ in society. As a result of these perceptions, extremists can now exploit the way society might perceive a young person or group of young people through coerced tactics to lure these young people under their control.

According to the European Court of Human Rights guidelines for preventing youth radicalisation have been presented, for example ‘Revising EU’s diagnosis of radicalisation’. Although this guideline is in place nowadays, it has become difficult for parents to recognise that online radicalisation does occur among the youth. As many parents do not keep up to date with recent online activities of their children and do not understand how online platforms are changing over time.

I believe that there is not enough awareness of how to identify or prevent online radicalisation for many parents. Even though social media might have facilitated the increase of youth radicalisation online, it could also help in combating radicalisation by raising awareness of this issue utilizing Facebook, Instagram, Youtube. Apart from this, the media, policymakers, and researchers need to work together to inquire into online activities of extremists and terrorists; therefore widening the knowledge.

Reflecting on the topic regarding ‘youth radicalisation’,

many factors contributing to online radicalisation are shunned. Researchers are slacking in their research on obtaining information on the comparison between countries, languages, group and platforms for manifesting youth radicalisation on social media. For instance, Iraq and Syria group ‘Shiite Jihad’ and Nigeria group ‘Boko Haram’ were one of the most active violent extremist groups online that made use of their social media platform for easy recruitments. Recruitments were not limited to these countries but extended to other European countries. Yet again, positioning social media in a negative light. Other social aspects might have contributed to why some young people have decided to participate in this violent extremism even when aware of the consequences involving victims of race or hate crime, recent political or religious conversation, the experience of poverty and social exclusion.

But the main question that lingers in my mind is ‘what can we do to prevent youths from online radicalisation?’ The answers depend on the suggestions and opinions of the viewers. For a better society in the world of social media, the prevention of radicalisation begins with the development of belonging, awareness, families and organisations working together in supporting youths to understand the core values of the society.



**With the ever-increasing power of social networks comes the increased capacity to encourage extremism.**

*Yewande Ogunjimi*



# THE ROLE OF YOUTUBE ALGORITHMS IN ONLINE RADICALISATION



*Amanda Blackhurst*

In today's world, it often feels impossible to escape the pervasiveness of social media. These online networks have effectively changed how people all over the world create community, maintain social interactions, and consume news. Though there are positives to this experience, such as connection on a scale not before accessible, and elements of community building and grassroots activism, there are also increasingly more insidious consequences. Today, more research reveals the dangerous link between online radicalisation and social media. One of the most pressing issues that has recently come to light is the role that algorithms play in driving online political polarization and radicalization. Most, if not all mainstream social media platforms employ algorithms that optimize retention rates.

Earlier this year, YouTube was at the center of criticism over the employment of algorithms that push videos and subsequently create playlists from video history that encourage increasingly extreme content.<sup>1</sup> YouTube utilizes “an algorithm to find out related and engaging content, so that users will stay on the site by clicking through videos. It has never revealed the details of that algorithm, which allows YouTube to generate profits by showing more advertising the longer its users stay on the site.”<sup>2</sup> Another important note is the fact that most of the content created for social media is hinged upon virality. Without regulation, “the danger with such viral phenomenon is, when combined with algorithmic recommendations and echo chamber effects<sup>3</sup>, ends up creating a reinforcing cycle of filter bubbles where users could be pushed into more radical views and opinions.”<sup>4</sup> Creators and online social media platforms

<sup>1</sup> Dearden, Lizzie. 2019. “Social Media Companies ‘Actively’ Serve Up Extremist Material To Users, Mps Say”. The Independent. <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/youtube-facebook-twitter-extremist-content-profit-home-affairs-a8884881.html>.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Bessi, Alessandro, Fabiana Zollo, Michela Del Vicario, Michelangelo Pulliga, Antonio Scala, Guido Caldarelli, Brian Uzzi, and Walter Quattrociocchi. 2016. “Users Polarization On Facebook And Youtube”. PLoS ONE. <https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0159641&type=printable>.

<sup>4</sup> Susarla, Anjana. 2019. “Unraveling The Impact Of Social Media On Extremism: Implications For Technology Regulation And Terrorism Prevention”. Legal Perspectives On Tech. The George Washington University Program on Extremism. 6. <https://www.voxpol.eu/download/report/Unraveling-the-Impact-of-Social-Media-on-Extremism.pdf>.

gain from content that can acquire the most views and clicks, even if the messages promote extremist, hateful, or false messages. As long as these social networks can profit from more views and prolonged engagements on their platforms, they have a financial interest and stake in unregulated content. As the YouTube algorithm shows, the system is built to reward videos that contain inflammatory and divisive messages.<sup>5</sup>

The main concern with the use of these algorithms, especially for young people, is the worry that what could start as a curious click on a YouTube video can eventually lead to a dangerous rabbit hole of misinformation, conspiracy theories, and/or hate speech. This issue is by no means a niche concern. With 2 billion daily users, most of whom are young, YouTube's viewership statistics are impressive.<sup>6</sup> A 2018 Pew Research Center study found that 85% of U.S. teens said they use YouTube, with 32% reporting they use YouTube the most out of other social media platforms, beating Instagram and Snapchat.<sup>7</sup> Another issue arises when there is a concern that younger people mainly rely on platforms like YouTube as their primary news source, without introductions to facts or different viewpoints, which could be offered through traditional media outlets. Technology researcher, Becca Lewis, is fearful of these trends, pointing to realities that make young people more vulnerable to instances of online radicalisation. Lewis notes that "sometimes instead of going to traditional news sources, people are just watching the content of an influencer they like, who happens to have certain political opinions. Kids may be getting a very different experience from YouTube than their parents expect, whether its extremist or not [...] YouTube has the power to shape people's ideologies more than people give it credit for."<sup>8</sup>

YouTube has claimed that it has taken measures to combat extremist content. The platform released a blog post in June 2019, which vowed to take further steps in mitigating the spread of extremist, hateful and misleading content. Some of the policies included embargoing videos that project any message of a group's superiority over another and any justification of discrimination or exclusion based on identity, removing videos that deny factual events, limiting recommendations of borderline content, increasing recommended videos from "authoritative sources," and suspending accounts from the YouTube Partner program if a channel and its creators continue to breach hate speech policies, leading to the demonetization of the creator's or channel's videos.<sup>9</sup>

Despite of these proposed changes, some remain sceptical of the platform's attempts at self-regulation when its bottom line depends on monetisation through viral videos and sustained period of viewing. Software engineer and former Google employee, Guillaume Chaslot, is a prominent critic of YouTube's algorithm system. He believes that this issue must require legislative action and more transparency.<sup>10</sup> Becca Lewis was similarly sceptical of YouTube's proposed changes. In the aftermath of the platform's announcements, she tweeted, "The platforms have become very good at issuing PR statements about proposed changes that don't ultimately have much effect. Any change in the right direction is good, but the platforms keep making promises they don't ultimately keep."<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Susarla, Anjana. 2019. "Unraveling The Impact Of Social Media On Extremism: Implications For Technology Regulation And Terrorism Prevention". 4.

<sup>6</sup> Weill, Kelly. 2018. "How Youtube Built A Radicalization Machine For The Far-Right". The Daily Beast. <https://www.thedailybeast.com/how-youtube-pulled-these-men-down-a-vortex-of-far-right-hate>.

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# TWITTER AND RADICALIZATION



## *Aditya Das*

In the 21st century, the average person's intake of news has changed. Reputable newspapers have developed phone apps and websites to supplement their paper publications, and also promote their stories in social media posts. The youth, in particular, has gravitated towards finding means of news consumption that are concise, engaging, and above all - quick. One of the most relevant sources of news for most youth, Twitter, provides quick headlines and news updates with their concise, short, and often misleading tweets.

The most predominant problem that exists on Twitter is the rampant existence of fake news. Often, it's sensationalized nature causes it goes

viral in comparison to post with real facts - which may not be as jarring or spectacular as the adulterated version of the events. Most of the fake news emerges as a reaction to a significant event or occurrence to either unduly support or oppose the event or occurrence. Studies by the Quilliam Foundation have shown that fake news on Twitter is most rampant after an impactful and sensational event. For instance, following the Parkland shootings in 2013, Twitter was flooded with conspiracy theories that accused shooting survivors to be actors trying to increase support for gun control - and this story remained rampant until Twitter itself had to step

in and shut it down. Similarly, fake news is also rampant before major elections where there is a need to influence the opinions and mindsets of people for ulterior motives. In turn, this fake news radicalizes the populace that is consuming it.

Some young people are passionate and eager-to-learn therefore more vulnerable to radicalisation if exposed to fake news. Often times, they only focus on the headlines available on Twitter rather than clicking on the full article to find out more details about the events. This behavioural tendency can be misused by news providers to propagate their biases as they often sensationalize their headlines to create a more adverse and heightened reaction from their readers, whose views and opinions are much stronger owing to the manner in which they consume this news. News providers with political biases capitalize on this consumption pattern, creating hyperbolic headlines to their articles which quite possibly are already biased in their content. Not just news providers, but extremist and terrorist organizations also employ Twitter as a means of engaging the youth and other users in their agenda.

Twitter is a microblogging website - one whose content is much smaller in average and aggregate size in comparison to traditional blogs. Their recent popularity arises from the tendency of the modern user to gravitate towards less time-consuming means of traditional daily activities. Microblogging websites like Twitter are advantageous to the agendas of extremist groups for a multitude of reasons. Owing to their accessible, unregulated and unmonitored interface, the traceability of the identity and source of extremist propaganda is harder to achieve and the potential for communication between recruiters is augmented. Studies by the Quilliam Foundation have shown after analysing Twitter feeds that Islamist extremist groups gene-

rally generate content to engage with opposing entities and authorities, in turn mobilizing both sides, polarizing their debates, and provoking these entities while compelling the viewers to pick a side. Twitter also enables these extremist organizations to comment publicly on international events and personalities in a multitude of languages, enabling their extremism to be clear and wide-reaching, and for their stance on a range of issues to be made public - garnering support for their cause and ideologies along the way.

Twitter's rules are also very simple - a message communicated in under 280 characters. Often times, the message that is conveyed through Twitter is misleading and simplifies the actual gravitas of the issue in an effort to solidify it. The focus hence has changed to comprehending news from the headline itself and not by reading the actual article to understand the event.

To combat the usage of the platform for extremism and radicalization, Twitter like other leading social media platforms has taken a number of measures. Account suspensions have gone up about 80% each year, and spikes in suspensions have occurred every time there has been a terrorist attack. Twitter like other platforms has stated that there is no "magic algorithm" to identify terrorist content on the Internet but that they continue to utilize other forms of technology like proprietary spam-fighting tools to supplement reports from their users and help identify repeat account abuse. It's public policy team has also partnered with organizations dedicated to countering violent extremism online to empower non-governmental voices against violent extremism. These steps, though meaningful, must be combined with other measures to prevent the arising of violent extremism online in the first place. Perhaps a preliminary account check or verification before users

can begin posting would be a more effective means to prevent violent online extremism. Though verifications and checks currently exist even at the preliminary stage, the technologies behind filtering and strengthening the security must be addressed. Often times, though accounts get banned or suspended for online radicalization and extremism, the damage has already been done as their message has been communicated to their target audience and left an effect on them. Steps must be taken at a preliminary stage to prevent this extremism from occurring, and at a post-suspension stage to track and address the effects of the online extremism. In a latest development in October 2019, Twitter announced that politicians, candidates, and nonprofit organizations would be banned from using Twitter as a means to further their campaign, but that private organizations like news agencies would be allowed to post campaign related material on their Twitter page. Though taking a step forward from other platforms like Facebook and Google, who continue to allow politicians to further their campaigns (even through falsehood) on their platforms, I believe that Twitter's decision to only selectively ban political campaigning on its platform is erroneous. Private organizations and news agencies are now the sole providers of political campaign information on Twitter - leaving much room for foul play and biases to occur and for personal and professional profit to be furthered.





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The most predominant problem  
that exists on Twitter is the rampant  
existence of fake news

*Aditya Das*



# SAFAA BOULAR AND HER RADICAL EXPERIENCE



*Ali Ahmed, William Burge*

**We are William and Ali, classmates at school and these are our views on radicalisation within the Muslim community in the UK.**

Growing up in Vauxhall had not been a simple start to life for Safaa Boular and her older sister, Rizlaine Bouler. They were brought up within a disquiet household by their troubled mother, Mina. Safaa was also isolated, not allowed to talk to her school friends on the phone, and was forbidden to go out with them. According to media reports Safaa was first introduced to the idea of joining the IS when Rizlaine tried to run away to Syria in 2014 to escape an arranged marriage set up by Mina. This shows how far the mother must've tormented them to feel the need to fly to Syria. Her attempt was not successful and Rizlaine was brought back to the UK.

Reportedly, Safaa began to talk online to a recruiter from Raqqa, Syria. This led to Safaa meeting hundreds of new people online, one of them being Naweed Hussain. Allegedly Naweed Hussain was an IS fighter who would groom and flatter young girls from the UK as an attempt to make them his Islamic brides. Naweed is one of the many online predators who groom vulnerable young girls into violent radicalisation. This was all new Safaa as her mother never allowed her to talk to boys during her early teenage years. Due to her anti-social, sheltered upbringing Safaa began to feel overwhelmed and excited from the attention she was receiving from Naweed and she slowly began to fall in love with him. Despite this, the conversation would take a turn in atmosphere

and the two would begin to talk about concerning topics involving the extremist intentions of Naweed. Naweed was doing this to persuade Safaa to join him in Syria and complete their radical, extremist intentions.

Safaa confessed to talking to Naweed and her plans to flee to Syria. In conclusion Safaa was sent to prison in Kent and the MI5 focused on Naweed. He was later killed in a planned US and RAF drone strike on a terrorist stronghold in Raqqa, Syria. Naweed and some undercover MI5 officers planned an attack on the British museum. Which after his death was to be carried out by the three women (Safaa, Mina and Rizlaine), which led to their arrest and these women are now serving life in jail.

This is one example that illustrates how young people can be targeted by violent people online who plan to brainwash and manipulate them into having radical thoughts and beliefs which, in this case, would've had a very catastrophic outcome. Attacks like these should put into perspective and emphasise how important it is that we prevent these online predators manipulating young people. This story should also make people realise the lack of protection online to do with whom you can get in contact with. This is a key player in most cases of radicalisation and one that needs to be controlled to save space.

But what if we told you this wasn't really Safaa's fault? Yes she may have said radical things and had very bad intentions but in some ways we can blame the environment she was brought up

in and how she was manipulated by online predators. But then we can think... what if she had support in school and was given information on how to notice the process of radicalisation which was happening to her, and how to realise she was being manipulated. We chose to write about this topic as young people need to know about events like these to make them more aware and careful in their day to day lives, offline and online. Times are changing and young people are becoming more and more independent within their lives and choices so it is even more important for them to be vigilant. This could be achieved through schools as teachers have direct contact with young people and have a responsibility to advise them on these types of situations and what potential hazards they should look out for. Companies can also come into schools to give talks to the students about the risks they take online and how they can prevent things happening to them as they did to Safaa Boular. An example of an Organisation that has this purpose is The Youth Empowerment and Innovation Project. The Youth Empowerment and Innovation Project (YEIP) is a funded programme that aims to design a youth-led, positive policy prevention framework for tackling and preventing the marginalisation and violent radicalisation among young people in Europe. They are focused on preventing situations like these, by educating teachers and others in how to spot certain signs in a young person who may be going through one of these unfortunate situations. We as a community need to support and promote these selfless projects/organisations to protect our young people across Europe.

**We can see how being a Muslim affected Safaa, does it affect me?** *Ali Ahmed.*


From this story, we can see that being a extreme Muslim isolated her from her social life, which changed her teenage years. I'm a male Muslim teenager growing up in London and I feel no different from anyone else surrounding me, this is because I live in a multi-cultural area in London. However for some this may be different as depending on where they live and who they are surrounded by. At this current time, being a Muslim would sometimes make you feel targeted by the racists as they assume that every Muslim is a terrorist. According to The Government's Official Statistics from 2016 to 2018 hate crimes towards religions as a whole rose by 40%, it went from there being 5,949 reported crimes to 8,336. 52% of these crimes were targeted at Muslims. However in my case, I've never experienced any racism and I also feel like I fit into society, I've had a normal childhood and upbringing. This is because schools and society as a whole, are now open to different religious beliefs and allow the religious to any needs that are required, this mainly include praying. It is the extremists and terro-

rists that give us Muslims a bad reputation. This bad image needs to be challenged at as it is false and does not have any positive effects on us. In Safaa's case she felt isolated from society mainly because of her mother and how she was brought up.

**My experience growing up as a non-Muslim in London.** *William Burge.*

Throughout my life I have been brought up to respect other people's views and beliefs, even if I cannot relate to them. In these modern times the UK, mainly London, has become a very multi-cultural community and has experienced a lot of changes throughout generations. In my case London is now becoming more diverse and I am open to these changes and respect them. I've never looked at anyone who has different beliefs as someone who is any less of a human being then I am. I believe this is because schools within this new generation do a good job educating young students about different cultures. This benefits students as giving them an understanding of different beliefs allows them to accept them, even if one cannot relate. Schools need to increase the amount of students who are educated on these topics as there are still stereotypes of cultures which mainly come from newspapers which have a very patriotic atmosphere. I suggest to add this to show that being a strict Muslim/ or any other religion cannot be portrayed as a bad thing like can be in the news. We need to come together as a society and as a community to face real problems and stop creating our own due to diversity.

# YOUTH RADICALIZATION



*Kristian Mower*

Youth Radicalisation has become a prominent aspect within society. Radicalisation can take many forms from the xenophobia and anti-globalist attitudes of many Britons to the growing uncertainties surrounding BREXIT, radicalisation is becoming more significant within not only society but is affecting the youth within Britain.

This issue has become a particular problem within the education system as there is no contemporary adaptive educational policy to deal with the issue of radicalisation, similarly the issue lies with the lack of spending on education in real terms as Conservative austerity and the reduction of the influence of local authorities over education has led to a lesser interventionist attitude to education. Creating a varying degree of radicalisation, as the school system is predicated on an inequality of funding as of 2017 school funding per pupil in parts of London is £8,500 compared with £4,346 in Devon. This is evidence that if the youth of Britain are left behind it is a cause of disillusionment and a cause of radicalisation as Radicalisation is more comprehensive than it simply being Islamic radicalisation within urban populated areas. But in fact, the left behind youth turn to organisations such as the BNP and UKIP as the far-right is also a threat to the stability

created by the provisions of the Education Acts in what is supposed to create an equality of opportunity between all races, genders or religion.

However, the subject of Citizenship is used successfully within primary schools and in high schools in teaching young citizens about fundamental British principles such as democracy and government. Which has been particularly useful to teach children about multiculturalism, ethnic diversity and religious tolerance, being important issues for children to know about particularly in relation to radicalisation in society. Demonstrating that government policy has attempted to tackle radicalism through progressive education. Further policies to reduce inequalities, such as the appropriate application of the contextual offers function on UCAS application which actively seeks to reduce the anguish caused by inequality of opportunity for those most vulnerable in society. Emphasising despite xenophobia within some areas of Britain and anti-progressive attitudes from some Britons, the education system itself has attempted to reduce extremism within schools, however, the xenophobia which is prevalent within wider society has not been dealt with.



## BEHIND THE FLAMING CROSS



*Ama Yarboi*

Whenever the topic of radicalization and terrorism is brought up, eyes turn to the Islamic faith. It is almost as though all other religions have been given immunity. According to Pew Research, Christianity is the largest religion in the world. This article will look into radical Christianity and why it should be addressed.

I believe that the biggest threat to violent radicalization of the youth is stigmatization. People are increasingly being defined by the stereotypes of their religion. Christians are given the individuality that is denied to Muslims. From my research of different articles relating to this topic, whenever there is an act of violent religious radicalization, Christians tend to be treated as mentally ill and detached from their religion. On the other hand, Muslims who commit violent acts are treated as representatives of Islam. Now, the Islamic religion is defined by the actions of extreme believers whereas Christianity is defined by its teachings.

As an illustration, I looked into two articles about Larry McQuilliams, who was a radical Christian according to a list by *The Hill Reporter*. According to *ABC News* “He shot more than 100 rounds into buildings in downtown Austin and tried to burn the Mexican consulate in the United States.” The *Washington Post* describes him as, “A homegrown terrorist with ties to the Phineas Priesthood.” Diving further into both articles, I believe there is a deliberate attempt to separate this man from his Christian faith. He is not identified as a Christian in any of the articles. His handwritten note about going against ‘Anti-God’ people is downplayed by both articles.

The right of a woman to have an abortion has been highly contested issue for many religious groups. Nonetheless, Christians have become more closely aligned to the issue. Now, in the United States, there is an increasing number of protestors at abortion clinics to prevent women from getting an abortion. “Acts of trespassing increased from 247 in 2016 to 823 in 2017, instances of obstruction tripled to 1,704 and threats of death or other harm nearly doubled to 62.” These pro-life advocates cite the Bible in their attempt to explain why they must prevent women from going through this very personal decision. It is very important to understand that extremism is the root of violent radicalisation. Even non-violent radical aggressions are capable of inciting hate. Someone watching these aggressions on the side-line might decide to take matters into their own hands.

The extreme views held by some Christians have become the driving force behind their acts of violence. An example of this driving force is the attack on a Mosque in Minnesota by Michael Hari. Hari wrote in his journal before the attack, “Let us consider Islam to be a problem that we as Christians are equipped to handle.” Although this article does an amazing job in connecting Hari’s actions to his own personal beliefs of Christianity, the article is very cautious about identifying this as an act of terrorism. One thing that makes Christians more anonymous in the crimes of radicalization is the fact that they are not generalized. When a Christian commits a radical act of violence, he or she is not linked directly to all Christians in the world. Rather, there is an effort to isolate their views from the entire faith. Another noteworthy observation

about this article is the lack of a Christian religious' leader's response to this act of terrorism. There is no expectation of Christian leaders to speak on extreme terrorist acts in comparison to other Muslim leaders. In an informal interview with the media and communications manager at London's East End Mosque, he commented on how they were often asked about Islam's view on a terrorist act after it happened. This reaction is not expected from Christian leaders. Most Christian terrorist attacks are treated as an individual act while a Muslim terrorist attack is generalized towards all people of that Faith. Most violent religious radicalisation stems from a misguided interpretation of religion's teachings.

I hope I made a convincing case about how individuals do not represent a religion. A religion can only inform people on how to live. It is up to believers to choose how they interpret this teachings and live accordingly.

# RADICALIZED DE-RADICALIZATION: HOW PREVENTION BECOMES POLICED MULTICULTURALISM



*Alessandro Zavoli*

## Introduction

A lot has been said about the thin line that separates the rightful power position that State institutions have with regard to citizenship and their growing need and tendency to overuse it. This discourse began with the age-old instances of natural law doctrine. Indeed, with the birth of the concept of Nation State, philosophers and jurists started to wonder where would that leave human freedom. They came out with the idea that deliver to the State's hands a part of everyone's freedom, the so-called natural pact, allows the creation of a harmonic relationship between citizens and institutions, that, if balanced, gives birth to progress, creativity, responsibility and, above all, *protection* to citizens (Fassò, 2005). And it is about this peculiar term on what this article would argue on. In particular, when it leads to a situation of unbalanced institutional power. It will be taken into consideration the notion of *spatialization*

of surveillance through a growing targeting and suspicion approach by UK institutions.

## Literature review

In the United Kingdom, an initial stage towards a preventive perspective arises in 1998, when, under the doctrine of Troubles' resolution, was launched in the context of the Good Friday Agreement and the Early Release Scheme. This was perceived as a symbolic act of peace as the release of prisoners of war was seen as a positive form of integration. This was followed by a more structured preventive institution was established in Northern Ireland, the Northern Ireland Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders (NIACRO), which aimed to educate and promote vocational training to offenders, as well as their children and families.

The inclusive nature of this preventative structure was acknowledged as a unique preventative form of community *participation*.

The development of a mentoring programme by NIA-CRO introduced new initiatives in developing the relationship between the mentors and the young *potential* offenders or re-offenders.

Thus, the first definition of the notion of *participation* in *prevention*, that will represent the core of the national Prevent Strategy, can be traced.

After the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US, a feeling of fear spread out around Western countries. The consequence has been a flooding sense of insecurity spread out by media all around the world. The result was a continuous search for a scapegoat, that, in force of the religious roots of such violent attacks, were the Muslims. The latter, who were considered as invisible citizens until that moment, are now put into the social category of *visible* subjects (Jamal et al.).

Thus, to talk about *prevention* and its interpretation and application by the UK government, it is necessary to start from the fact that building up prevent policies and strategies implies, at least at a first stage, that the targeted minorities become more *visible* to the eyes of the institutions.

In order to let such social groups being in *evidence*, advanced technology comes to the aid, as, for instance, the project Champion in Birmingham. There, both covert and overt Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) cameras were placed in specific areas of the city prevalently inhabited by Muslim people (Lewis, 2010).

In 2003, the UK introduced an embryonic stage of the so-called Prevent strategy, under the CONTEST counter-terrorism programme (Qurashi). Then, after 7th July 2005 bombing, the 'Prevent' strategy introduced in 2003 was expanded and better funded, and, at the beginning, it aimed to target limited high risk British-Asian residential areas. This has been expanded between 2007 and 2008, when the Prevent 'pathfinder' mapped more than 70 high-risk communities.

The gradual expansion of the influence of Prevent strategy permits to bring out the essential notion of *space*, which is a *sine qua non* condition in such safeguarding approaches. Indeed, when *prevention* becomes institutionally centralized the State territory ends up to be a defined area where everyone is a *visible* suspected and an active participant of the monitoring project.

So, *prevention* moves within the so-called *pre-criminal space*, that could be presented as a perpetual state of alert, where the sense of suspicion becomes totalizing. The immediate effect of this phenomena is the progres-

sive de-personalization of subjects, that are now part of a big risk-calculation algorithm; this is the way that leads to an all-encompassing control. The post-2011 Prevent strategies seems to correspond to the above mentioned perspective.

### **Spatialized ideologies behind the Prevent Strategy: a terminology of suspect**

It has been mentioned that the nationalization of the Prevent Strategy creates a pre-criminal space. Moving forward, it has to be underlined that this space, to being productive in terms of *preventive actions*, has to be *public*. Therefore, every citizen is expected to *participate* actively 'for the good cause'. The introduced notion of *public participation*, within this counter-terrorism scheme, has its practical application in building up workshops, labs, cultural associations and whatever has to do with *socialization*. So, on the one hand, citizens have the *responsibility* as active stakeholders within the process, but, on the other hand, are exposed to the *public environment* as potential suspects.

I agree with Qurashi when he states that, especially after the 2015 Counter-Terrorism and Security Act (Qurashi), a strong community policing system through a collaborative relationship between local communities and authorities is being designed. In this way, *socialization* assumes a double-edged meaning.

Such cooperative system needs a close communication between different sectors, that's why one of the most relevant Prevent-related safeguarding panels is the so-called 'Channel'. The latter consists of a multi-agency panel, aiming to collect as much information as possible about potential terrorists over the UK territories.

For instance, the 'Channel' does receives data from the NHS (National Health Service), which represents one of its main data providers. Peculiarly, the health sector is regulated by the 'Channel Duty Guidance', a sort of leaflet that explains which are the rules to individuate a person *vulnerable* to radicalization and extremist ideologies. It is worth focusing on the term *vulnerable*, that is repeated a lot of times within the pamphlet. Indeed, the term belongs to the medical field, which is one of 'Guidance' 's interests. So, the notion of *vulnerability* is located in *public health* geography of *prevention*, where the pre-criminal space is characterised by the notion of *contagion*. Ultimately, radicalization is considered here as a state of infection, that, if *prevented* with the participation of experts from the *public* sector, is avoided in its flooding.



Again, the term *public* helps us to deepen the real essence of *participation*. Indeed, as a last resort, is exactly within *public participation* that people become more *visible*, so *controllable*. The thin line between *public* and *private* appears now less positionable since such a system has the government at the top of the hierarchy, the public sector in the middle, and the *vulnerable* minorities at its base. The result is a complex social structure where everyone is in charge to look at someone else. The above mentioned 'Channel Duty Guidance' represents a remarkable example.

### Final considerations

In accordance with the theorization made by Francesco Ragazzi, this situation can be synthesized under the expression of *policed multiculturalism*. In this sense, all the 'Prevent' initiatives aim to de-radicalize *vulnerable* communities, by '*supporting*' them. Although, the context of application is, as in this case, a nationalized *pre-criminal space*, 'support' in reality becomes '*suppress*' potential threats to the national security. Thus, despite a lot of past and current initiatives deserves praises, the narration seems to be already too much focus on *monitoring*, instead of *promoting*. Paradoxically, a political action with a supportive goal ends up to shape a multicultural society where some ethnic groups have more *agency* (quote) than others and on others. The risk behind this approach is to build up a citizenship where minorities are more and more alienated under a frightened and a wary gaze, where individuals are divided into spies and suspects.



**The term public helps us to deepen the  
real essence of participation.**

*Alessandro Zavoli*





# THE SAD LIFE OF THE EXETER BOMBER



## A STORY OF MENTAL ILLNESS

*Arthur Pierce*

In 2008, Nicky Reilly walked into a café with a nail bomb. After sitting down for a while, he stood up and nervously headed to the bathroom. Moments later, visitors to the café were startled by a loud noise and Nicky soon emerged from the bathroom, blood cascading from his face. Over the next few hours, his story began to unravel.



This is a story that has held firm in my imagination for many years. I was near the café when the incident occurred, and although I didn't hear the explosion, I remember every shop and café in the high street emptying as police went from building to building looking for other explosives. Then I began to wonder - what drives a person to attempt to kill dozens of innocent people for seemingly no reason?

Later I learned that Nicky Reilly was not an evil man; people who knew him even called him a 'big friendly giant', a reference to his large stocky frame. The issue was, that although he was 22 at the time of the attempted bombing, he had the mental age of a ten year old and had even spent some time in a mental institution. He was socially isolated for much of his life and at the age of 18, began conversing online to a group of extremists in Pakistan.

They took this naive young man and moulded him into something potentially dangerous. Even before the bombing, his growing radicalisation caught the eye of MI5 who ultimately concluded that he was not a danger. After all, men like him - withdrawn and mentally unwell - are almost always more of a danger to themselves than anyone else, with suicide being the leading cause of death for men of his age group.

His story of radicalisation was not borne on some distant battlefield, nor was it some deep commitment to an ideology or a corrupted interpretation of faith (his conversion to a religion was led by those who encouraged him to build the bomb), but instead stemmed from a fragile mind, and men of ill intent.

### **Mental illness and radicalisation**

Researchers have spent a long time trying to understand

the causes of radicalisation. It is generally seen as a gradual process, often stemming from the breakdown of belief systems, persecution (or the perception of it), isolation, or a desire to counter a perceived injustice. In some cases, certainly the case with Nicky Reilly there was a need to find a group to fit in with. Radicalisation is not linked to one single belief system; there have been radicals of every faith and none, and from both the far-right, and the far-left. Though despite this fact there is a kind of narrative discrepancy, perpetrators of terroristic acts and violent extremists outside of Islam are more likely to be depicted as a victim of mental illness than those who are Muslim. Indeed, one study concluded that when a violent act is committed by a Muslim there is a 488% greater chance that it would be described as terrorism. This narrative needs to change.

Mental health by itself is not a causal factor for radicalisation. Roughly one in four people suffer from some form of mental health condition. Even though I have been diagnosed with clinical depression and generalised anxiety disorder, and take a daily high dosage of antidepressants simply to function. Most people with such conditions lead fairly ordinary lives with no particular compulsion to radicalisation or violent behaviour. Indeed, as I implied above, most people with serious mental health conditions are a danger to themselves. You need only look at the rates of suicides amongst PTSD-suffering combat veterans or those with severe depression. Nicky Reilly, himself, died in his cell in 2016 of an apparent suicide, which is the leading cause of death of men of his age group.

But for those with a mental health condition, if it is severe enough, and in certain situations, can and does inspire a sense of isolation,

persecution, and disillusionment. All of these are contributing risk factors, and most were probably factors in the eventual radicalisation of Nicky Reilly, and others.


### **But, what can be done?**

There is, I believe, a significant stigma surrounding mental illness. This could eventually lead those with mental health conditions, even relatively minor ones, to feel disconnected, and perhaps even persecuted by society at large. Addressing this, perhaps through raising awareness, campaigns and other actions could not only steer mentally ill people at risk of violent radicalisation away from that path, but also better the lives of millions of people across the country.

Betus, Allison and Kearns, Erin and Lemieux, Anthony, 'Terrorism' or 'Mental Illness?': Factors that Impact How Media Label Terrorist Attacks (August 7, 2019). Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3433933> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3433933>



# RADICALIZATION, TERRORISM & SOCIAL ENTERPRISES



*James Myers Antiaye*

There are various reasons why people may be susceptible to radicalization and committing acts of terrorism. One of the main reasons is illustrated by the grievance theory which focuses on how perceived injustices and social/economic/political structural flaws can cause individuals to become radicalised.

In the fight against violent radicalisation that can be addressed and potentially prevented. The 2018 Global Terrorism index states that 'conflict and political terror are the primary drivers of terrorist activity', explaining that 'Extremist groups provide a redemption narrative' for alienated young people with a criminal record. This reaffirms the grievance theory and further illustrates the type of scenarios that can lead to terrorism. We can see that most countries that suffer from terrorism such as Iraq, Syria, Nigeria and Afghanistan experience high political instability and terror. For instance, in Nigeria there are various tribal/religious conflicts and corruption amongst the government is widespread. These tribal/religious differences have caused separatists movements, civil wars and terrorist attacks. It could be argued that 'bad governance, corruption, persistent economic hardship and rising inequality' led to the formation of Boko Haram.

Economic inequality can lead to people becoming disenfranchised and therefore more susceptible to radical terrorist organisations. Social enterprises can help reduce economic inequality. Many social enterprises are increasingly providing educational opportunities for those from less privileged backgrounds. For instance, Sudiksha Knowledge Solutions and Grameen Bank are organizations from India and Bangladesh re-

spectively that offer alternative methods of education and sources of capital. Sudiksha Knowledge Solutions aims to use creative teaching techniques to aid the development of underprivileged pre-school children while promoting entrepreneurship amongst women. Grameen bank is a microfinance organization that allows people with no/limited access to conventional credit to obtain loans (which could be used for education, enterprise, agriculture etc.)

An organisation in Indonesia called Retro Café illustrates how a social enterprise can disengage terrorists from their radical views. Retro Café 'prepares & sells retro-style grilled seafood' while employing ex terrorists and high school dropouts to work in the café. The Co-owner, Ferry, is a former convicted terrorist who served time in prison and it seems that many of those employed have a similar background. Ferry explained that two of the main issues he faced upon his release from prison were finding employment and a new social circle. The job at Retro café helped him address these issues by providing an environment for him to gain work experience and interact with people from a similar background who are also trying to reform. The founder of the café, Marty is a former terrorist and this may have been why he used indirect disengagement methods as opposed to the 'common terrorist rehabilitation strategies such as cognitive behavioural therapy' and 'religious counselling by clerics'. As of 2017 (publication of source document) ten former terrorists have pursued further employment after working at Retro Café. This confirms that indirect disengagement methods such as 'engaging terrorists in

enterprise-building, broadening their social circles, serving customers as a humbling process' and 'building harmonious relations with all stakeholders' can be effective.

Tackling radicalisation and terrorism requires a multi-dimensional approach, as there are a wide range of factors that can lead to people becoming radicalized. This means that there needs to be a variety of different approaches to tackle terrorism. One of The UN Global Counter Terrorism strategy's four pillars is 'addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism'<sup>1</sup>. Promoting social enterprises can help to prevent radicalisation by directly engaging with potential/current terrorists and providing economic opportunities to people susceptible to radicalisation.

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<sup>1</sup> UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy < <https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/en/un-global-counter-terrorism-strategy#poal>



# IS YOUTH RADICALISATION A SAFEGUARDING AND CHILD PROTECTION ISSUE?

*Maija Linnala and Amanda Blackhurst*

Within the UK, there has been growing concern over the radicalisation of children and young people in recent years. In 2017, the Department for Education (DfE) released a research report that investigated the emerging practice surrounding radicalisation in safeguarding. The aim of the study was to develop a greater understanding of how Local Authorities were already responding to radicalisation and to gather evidence for developing effective social care interventions.<sup>1</sup>

There is current debate around the idea of youth radicalisation being a safeguarding issue. Various organisations and UK government agencies, including the NSPCC, Department of Education, and other local safeguarding boards, have included radicalisation as a type of harm that is under the remit of safeguarding and child protection agencies. In 2015, the DfE released The Prevent<sup>2</sup> duty in regards to schools and childcare providers. The document stated that “protecting

children from the risk of radicalisation should be seen as part of schools’ and childcare providers’ wider safeguarding duties, and is similar in nature to protecting children from other harms (e.g. drugs, gangs, neglect, sexual exploitation, whether these come from within the family or are the product of outside influences.”<sup>3</sup> When looking at the relationship between youth radicalisation with child sexual exploitation and trafficking, Andy Elvin, chief executive of the Adolescent and Children’s Trust said, “They should, strategically, be tackled together, they are all forms of grooming and the techniques used by those exploiting children in all three have many similarities. Also, the underlying vulnerability of those being exploited is also similar.”<sup>4</sup>

In the NSPCC’s guidance to protect children from radicalisation, it advocates for radicalisation to be included in organisation’s safeguarding policies and procedures and for agencies within communities to work in cooperation



<sup>1</sup> Chisholm, T., Coulter, A. and Public, K. (2017). Safeguarding and radicalisation. Department for Education. Available at: [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/635262/Safeguarding\\_and\\_Radicalisation.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/635262/Safeguarding_and_Radicalisation.pdf). 4.

<sup>2</sup> Prevent is a UK anti-terrorism programme

<sup>3</sup> Department for Education (2015). The Prevent duty: Departmental advice for schools and childcare providers. [online] Department for Education. Available at: [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/439598/prevent-duty-departmental-advice-v6.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/439598/prevent-duty-departmental-advice-v6.pdf). 5.

<sup>4</sup> Hardy, R. (2016). Child exploitation, radicalisation and trafficking: the key questions. The Guardian. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/social-care-network/2016/mar/07/child-protection-social-worker-radicalisation-exploitation-trafficking>




to tackle threats of radicalisation and extremism.<sup>5</sup> Similar to these points, the 2017 DfE research report found that one of the themes surrounding the emerging practice and challenges of radicalisation included “working effectively with partner agencies, including the police, schools and healthcare professionals is central to the response to radicalisation across many local authorities - and a source of key challenges.”<sup>6</sup> Information sharing, partner agencies being overzealous in referrals, and unclear understandings “of which cases were appropriate for safeguarding or child protection intervention” were among the primary challenges to partnership working that were discussed.<sup>7</sup> These issues are commonly identified among safeguarding and child protection professionals and practitioners. In recent years, there have been more initiatives and projects to tackle split responses among child protection and safeguarding partners.

An example of this is PROCHILD,<sup>8</sup> a European Union funded research project aimed to identify fragmentation among services and develop a multi-professional, integrated model of cooperation with stakeholders involved in response to violence against children. The project has already published reports regarding the causes of violence against children and the role of parental mental health, how to detect violence against children, support child victims and integrate services for their protection and support, and elements and criteria for early detection of abused minors. The latest work package from the project centered on developing protocols in accordance with a transferrable, interdisciplinary intervention model by conducting roundtables and focus groups with professionals working in child safeguarding. In these sessions, professionals and practitioners working in Social and Health Services, Educational Agencies, Police, and Judicial Authorities, and relevant Third Sector actors provided feedback to identify and analyse the problems that are currently hindering the further integration and collaboration among services and define shared protocols for collaboration among services.

Though there is wide recognition of radicalisation as being a threat to children and young people, not everyone believes in the current approach of partnerships between UK anti-terror government programmes, such as Prevent and Channel and safeguarding professionals. Among the most vocal opponents of this arrangement are those from the social work sector. Through partnerships with Prevent and Channel, McKendrick and Finch (2017: 12-13) argue that “in this new carnation, social work is fundamentally judgmental and exists as an agent of social control in terms of targeting service users, cultural practices or ideological beliefs that do not accord with Western neo liberal ones.”<sup>9</sup> Furthermore, McKendrick and Finch argue that anti-radicalisation work can pose a threat to social work values, “which may promote working with families in ways that could breach fundamental human rights.”<sup>10</sup> The worry of the current response forcing social workers to jeopardise the core values of social work and become another arm of expanding discriminatory state policies have also been echoed by other practitioners and scholars alike. Stanley and Guru (2015: 2) “think that more debate is needed about the role of social work and policy influences, because social work can find itself unwittingly posing a risk to the very families we set out to help. Moreover, social workers might find themselves pawns in an ideologically driven moral panic without the benefit of debate about how we can make a contribution to families, and to this emerging practice issue.”<sup>11</sup>

Though it might not be practical to completely negate the role that social workers have in youth radicalisation prevention, the current partnership with anti-terror programmes and approaches of their role and style of interventions are questions that need to be reimagined in order to uphold the values of social work, prevent engagement with discriminatory policies, and mitigate damage to trust and relationship building with communities.



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<sup>5</sup> NSPCC. (2020). Radicalisation. Available at: <https://learning.nspcc.org.uk/safeguarding-child-protection/radicalisation/>

<sup>6</sup> Chisholm, T., Coulter, A. and Public, K. (2017). Safeguarding and radicalisation. 5 and 6.

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<sup>8</sup> PROCHILD European Commission under the Rights, Equality and Citizenship Programme 2014-2020 810109 — PROC <https://www.prochildproject.org/REC-AG-2017/REC-RDAP-GBV-AG-2017>

<sup>9</sup> McKendrick, D and Finch, J. (2017). ‘Under Heavy Manners?’: Social Work, Radicalisation, Troubled Families and Non-Linear War. The British Journal of Social Work. 47 (2), 12-13.

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<sup>11</sup> Stanley, T and Guru, S. (2015). Childhood Radicalisation Risk: An Emerging Practice Issue. Social Work in Action. 27 (5), 2.

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## **DON'T FORGET HELP RAISE FUNDS FOR 99% CAMPAIGN WHENEVER YOU SHOP ONLINE!**

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The 99% Campaign is a youth-led initiative and digital participation programme aiming to make society more inclusive, fair and responsive to young people's views and realities. It achieves its mission by giving direct voice to the most marginalised young people and by dispelling negative stereotypes.

### **What are the aims of the 99% Campaign?**

"Disadvantage thinking" about young people is addressed and positive stories are promoted. Discrimination, negative perceptions and stereotypes about young people are tackled within society, political institutions and service providers. New youth opportunities are created while current opportunities are highlighted and enhanced. 99% Campaigners receive high quality volunteering and internship opportunities, and through training, mentoring, accreditation and support they become role models and leaders within their communities.



### **Who is driving the 99% campaign?**

Young people including the 1%! To give them a chance; inspire them; help them feel they are given more respect; act as "one-stop-shop" for information on civic engagement activities; reward and make them employable

How? Using online and face to face training content we will enable hundreds of young people to gain skills in research and campaigning, presenting their own experiences and those of further thousands of their peers to key public figures via a combination of media.

Ultimate goal: To bring change from the bottom up!

## **GET INVOLVED**

Support us to promote positive image of young people. Share with us your positive stories, views, opinions on issues that affect you and become active part of their solutions. Submit your content at [contact@iars.org.uk](mailto:contact@iars.org.uk) Sign in the 99% Campaign pledge and support young people who are making a real difference in their diverse community.

Sign up for our FREE face to face training sessions and learn how to strengthen your voice online or simply get your inspiration from our online e-tools . To find out more and join our free sessions please email [99percentcampaign@iars.org.uk](mailto:99percentcampaign@iars.org.uk)

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